Steven Brams is a Professor of Politics at New York University. He has a B.S. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a Ph.D. from Northwestern.
Professor Brams researches game theory, social choice theory, fair division, voting and elections, and international politics. Brams is best known for using the techniques of game theory, public choice theory, and social choice theory to analyze voting systems and fair division. He is one of the independent discoverers of approval voting, as well as an extension of approval voting to multiple-winner elections known as Satisfaction approval voting.
“The Undercut Procedure: An Algorithm for the Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items” (with D. Marc Kilgour and Christian Klamler)
“Two-Person Fair Division of Indivisible Items: An Efficient, Envy-Free Algorithm” (with D. Marc Kilgour and Christian Klamler)
“Paths to Victory in Presidential Elections: The Setup Power of Noncompetitive States” (with D. Marc Kilgour)